An individual-based framework for the study of by Peter J. Veazie
International Journal for Quality in Health Care 2006; Volume 18, Number 4: pp. 314–319 10.1093/intqhc/mzl011
Advance Access Publication: 3 May 2006
International Journal for Quality in Health Care vol. 18 no. 4
© The Author 2006. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of International Society for Quality in Health Care; all rights reserved 314
An individual-based framework for the 
study of medical error
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Abstract
Background. In the late 1990s, medical error came into focus as a problem to be explicitly acknowledged and addressed.
Research on this topic is amassing in the epidemiology of medical error and the system and human factors that contribute to
error. In addition, however, an understanding of medical errors in terms of the underlying decision process is needed.
Objective. To present an individual-based framework for the study of medical errors in the context of the decision maker.
Results. A framework is developed in terms of four state spaces: the decision environment, problem, goal, and action spaces.
The role of information uncertainty is discussed. The framework is purposefully simple to provide flexibility and options for
research-specific extensions, but sufficient structure is imposed to guide understanding and investigation.
Conclusion. Understanding medical error in terms of the proposed framework can guide research and subsequent interven-
tions by illuminating where in the decision process such errors are generated.
Keywords: clinical guidelines, decision making, medical error
The 1999 Institute of Medicine’s report To Err is Human high-
lighted the prevalence and epidemiology of medical errors [1]. In
the year 2000, the report to the president Doing What Counts for
Patient Safety highlighted organizational factors as important
causes of medical errors [2]. Subsequent interest in understanding
and mitigating errors has continued to grow [3–5]. Research has
focused on characterizing errors and understanding how organi-
zational factors interact with human factors to facilitate and miti-
gate errors [6,7]. Such a focus is warranted [8], and frameworks
for this analysis have been provided [e.g. 9–15]. Moreover,
research from this perspective has been fruitful [16–24].
The human factors’ approach to error is based on under-
standing how human response moderates environmental and
outcome covariation [25,26]. The purpose is to inform the
design of task environments that minimize adverse conse-
quences of human factors [27,28]. For example, color is sym-
bolic for humans; to minimize errors associated with
mistaken interpretations of color schemes, a task environ-
ment should be designed to adhere to color-coding standards.
In the United States, humans expect valve handles to rotate
counterclockwise to increase flow; hence, the design of such
items should correspond to this expectation.
However, the explanation of error in terms of the interaction
between environmental and human factors does not fully replace
the explanation in terms of the decision maker. Understanding
the role of the decision process in the generation of medical
errors remains an important research effort, because in the con-
text of health care there may remain a component of human
judgement amenable to design constraints yet to be identified,
and human judgement cannot likely be completely designed
away. On the basis of the presented framework, research can
locate medical errors in the decision-making process and identify
additional human factors amenable to control via environmental
design or develop interventions on the judgement process.
A framework for medical error
In this paper, the means by which a decision maker achieves an
objective is framed in terms of relationships between four state
spaces: (i) a decision environment, (ii) a problem space, (iii) a
goal space, and (iv) an action space [29]. These are connected by
three operators: (i) a problem-selection operator that links the envir-
onment to identified problems, (ii) a goal-setting operator that
links identified problems to goals, and (iii) an action-selection oper-
ator that links goals to actions. Together, the state spaces and
operators compose the dynamical system depicted in Figure 1.
The decision environment specifies the physical and social
conditions (including the patient state) of a decision-maker,
what Newell [30] calls the task environment. In a broad sense,
the environment of an entity is the universe with the excep-
tion of the entity itself; hence, each entity’s environment is the
only one that excludes itself and is therefore unique. Such an
expansive definition is seldom useful; more specialized defini-
tions are usually invoked. In the present context, the decision
environment comprises a subset of the general environment
that informs the decision task. Specifically, the decision envir-
onment comprises those aspects of the general environment
that can logically vary to constrain or produce changes in the
decision. A useful operational definition requires specifying
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the factors that can impact the decision process. This not only
includes informative patient characteristics but constraints
such as policies, formularies, or physical barriers as well.
The problem space is the set of statements that connote
expected undesirable trajectories in the environment, parti-
tioned by semantic equivalence. For example, the statement
‘The problem is that the patient’s glycated hemoglobin level is
too high’ connotes that the physician believes the patient is
on a trajectory whereby their glycated hemoglobin (A1c) lev-
els indicate undesirable consequences. In a broad sense, the
problem space is the set of meaningful substatements that can
complete the phrase ‘The problem is...’ regardless of how
appropriate or applicable the phrase is.
The goal space comprises the set of statements that index
possible subsets of the environment, partitioned by semantic
equivalence. Therefore, to satisfy a patient-oriented goal is to
redirect a patient to a state in the environment space indexed
by the goal statement. For example, a goal may be to ‘obtain
patient A1c level information’ or ‘bring the patient’s A1c lev-
els within the range of 6 to 7%’.
The action space comprises the set of statements describ-
ing possible actions that a decision maker may take, parti-
tioned by semantic equivalence. For example, an action may
be ‘Send patient to get A1c lab test’ or ‘Start the patient on
metformin.’ Because it is possible that numerous statements
have the same semantic content, the problem, goal, and
action spaces are equipped with semantic equivalence classes
to partition each space according to the relevant aspects of
the framework. For each space, it is the semantic content of a
statement that matters, not the specific phrasing.
Operationally, for most applications regarding error, the
components of these spaces need not be explicitly defined. As
detailed below, only subsets comprising the criteria for deter-
mining errors need be explicitly stated. Any statement of a
problem, goal, or action need only be compared with the
equivalence class associated with the criterion; if a statement
has the same meaning as the criterion, then the corresponding
problem, goal, or action is not an error, otherwise it is an
error. The operational advantage is that only a small subset of
each space need be identified: the statements representing
appropriate problems, goals, and actions.
The problem-selection operator, which links the decision
environment to the problem space, extracts information from
the environment, constructs a mental representation, and
identifies a corresponding problem. The goal-setting opera-
tor, which links the problem and goal spaces, identifies a
preferred goal corresponding to a given problem. The action-
selection operator, which links the goal and action spaces,
identifies a preferred action. Each operator is influenced by
the decision environment as well as the decision-maker’s
experience and expertise; hence, each operator includes an
interpretation component that integrates environment
information into the operator’s task, which may include
patient clinical information as well as constraining informa-
tion such as guidelines, policies, and legalities.
A definition of error
Most definitions of error include those attributable to incor-
rect intentions and those attributable to unintended actions
(e.g. [1,2]; see reason [8] for an explication of these types).
Both are captured by the definition presented here. Formally,
error is defined here as a relation on a set of elements relative
to a criterion such that an identified problem, goal, or action is an
error if it does not match the criterion (or is not an element of
a criteria set). For the framework depicted in Figure 1, such
errors can be defined for the sets of problems, goals, and
actions. Errors exist for a judgement regarding a given patient if
the identified problems for the patient do not match the problem
criterion, the selected goals do not match the goal criterion, or
the selected actions do not match the action criterion.
I assume there is an appropriate problem description (or
set of descriptions) for each environment, an appropriate goal
(or set of goals) for each problem description, and an appro-
priate action (or set of actions) for each goal, which can be
many-to-many relations. Statements such as ‘z is appropriate
for x’ (e.g. ‘the goal g is appropriate for the problem descrip-
tion p’) are interpreted to mean z is a criterion in the set of
possible z’s associated with the given x. Given this interpreta-
tion, it is evident that each criterion in our framework is
derived from the preceding criterion except for the problem
criterion, which is derived from the environment. Note that
requiring the identification of appropriate problems, goal, and
actions is a necessary constraint on the framework because
the absence of identifiably appropriate or corresponding
inappropriate elements of each space precludes the study of
Figure 1 Patient Care Model. For a given state of the
decision environment, the problem-selection operator identi-
fies a corresponding problem, the goal-setting operator iden-
tifies an associated goal and the action-selection operator
selects an action. The dashed lines indicate the influence of
the decision environment on each operator, which includes
explicit policy, legal, or system constraints as well as patient-
specific information.
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error. Moreover, the assumption, there exists appropriate sets
of elements, is necessary for informed behavior; in the
absence of this assumption, we are left with the uniform ran-
dom selection of problems, goals, and actions. Consider the
case where there are only two possible actions, in which one
is bad for the patient and the second is even worse. We must
either randomly or deliberately choose. Clearly, if the goal is
to minimize harm, the first action is the appropriate one even
though it is harmful.
We can define error functions for the operators as well.
Any given operator partitions its input space into two sets:
one comprising inputs for which the operator maps to an
appropriate output and the other comprises inputs for which
the operator maps to an inappropriate output (an error).
Alternatively, any given input partitions the set of possible
operators into error-generating and non-error-generating
operators. That is, for a given input, each possible operator
either identifies an appropriate output or identifies an inap-
propriate output (an error). These characteristics of the oper-
ators distinguishes the case of an appropriate operator that
maps an error in its input to an error in its output from the
case of an inappropriate operator that maps a correct input to
an error in its outputs.
Error criteria
Criteria are arbitrary subsets of the space on which error is meas-
ured; their identification depends on the purpose of the error
measurement. Criteria may be defined in terms of the same space
or in terms of related spaces. For example, criteria for actions
may be defined in terms of desired resultant outcomes; hence, an
appropriate action is just that action that produces a specified
result such as improved health outcome or reduced cost.
If we incorporate uncertainty regarding patient responses
and consider a distribution of potential outcomes is associ-
ated with a given observed patient and a given action, then
one plausible definition of the criterion on the action space is
the action that maximizes the expected outcome given the
patient state. Another definition incorporates the notion of
satisfying [31]—that is, select any action that satisfies a set of
constraints. Figure 2 depicts the expected outcomes of three
actions (denoted as a1, a2, and a3) on a continuously scaled
patient state dimension. Criteria specified in terms of the
maximum expected outcome are represented by the curve
denoted a1 if the patient’s state is less than α, a2 if the patient’s
state is between α and β or greater than χ; a3 if the patient’s
state is between β and χ; and a2, again, if the patient’s state is
greater than χ. If criterion was specified as those actions that
produce satisfactory outcomes, then for a given patient any
action with expected outcome in the satisfactory region
would be appropriate (i.e. not an error). As shown in Figure 2,
action  a1 is appropriate if the patient state is less than α;
action a2 if between α and αs; either a2 or a3 if between αs and
χs; and a2 if the patient state is greater than χs.
Criteria for the goal space may be defined by extending this
logic backward from the action space. Assuming a distribu-
tion of potential actions is associated with each goal, the goal
criterion may be defined as that goal for which the most likely
action is the action criterion defined above. Similar logic can
be used to define the criterion for the problem identification
space.
Uncertainty and criterion distributions
In the preceding exposition, I assume an appropriate
response exists for each environmental state. However, in
practice, criteria are often based on information from a sub-
space of the environment; consequently, they may only
approximate the appropriate response. This is evident if addi-
tional information would change the judgement of what is
appropriate. For example, a researcher may define a criterion
for action such that given specific patient characteristics and a
goal of lowering A1c, the appropriate action is to administer
drug A. The researcher would consider as an error a physi-
cian’s move that does not include drug A under these circum-
stances. However, if the patient has a fatal allergy to drug A,
the error criterion does not apply.
Partial information and full information criteria do not
necessarily correspond. Variation in appropriate responses is
generated by variation in unobserved information and can
produce mistaken judgements regarding error when using
partial information criteria. This implies practice guidelines
that are based on partial information should not be trans-
formed into inviolable practice rules.
Example
Dhillon [32] discusses research in medication errors and
describes eight types of error: prescribing error, unauthorized-
drug error, incorrect-dose error, incorrect-dosage-form
error, incorrect-administration-method error, incorrect-drug-
preparation error, omission error, and incorrect-time error.
Identifiable (in theory) with each error are corresponding
responsible persons, whether they be physicians, nurses,
pharmacists, or designers of medical technologies. Each type
of error can be studied to determine contributing factors; for
example, high nurse work loads may increase the instances of
some errors. Numerous design elements have been developed
to mitigate the consequence of contributing human factors;
Figure 2 Expected outcomes for three actions (a1, a2, and a3)
across potential patient health states.
 Patient State
E
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
 
O
u
t
c
o
m
e
 
a1 
a2
a3
U
n
s
a
t
i
s
f
a
c
t
o
r
y
 
 
S
a
t
i
s
f
a
c
t
o
r
y
 
 
αβ  χ αs 
  s χ
b
y
 
g
u
e
s
t
 
o
n
 
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
 
7
,
 
2
0
1
4
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 A framework for the study of error
317
for example, computerized physician order entry forms can
improve readability of prescriptions and automated dispens-
ing devices promise more accurate filling of prescriptions.
Nonetheless, despite increased design efforts, personal
judgement remains important in determining medication. For
example, prescription error includes the wrong drug and
dosage selection; these are decisions that require provider
judgement. This paper provides a framework within which
models of judgement and behavior can be implemented to
better understand how errors can occur at the individual level
in the presence of existing error reduction design constraints.
Implementation
One study design, as an initial stage of a research program to
locate error within the individual-based framework, is as fol-
lows: provide patient case information to a sample of physi-
cians; have the physicians identify corresponding problems,
goals, and actions; and then have a panel of experts judge
whether errors occur. In this design, the error criteria are
implicit in the measurements derived from expert judgement;
however, the presented framework is amenable to models
and methods that include error specifications from clinical
evidence and guidelines as well as the inclusion of specific
expert systems and decision support algorithms. Indeed, error
criteria are arbitrary as to their source and definition.
The experts judge whether the identified problem, goal,
and actions are appropriate. From this information, we can
infer an operator is not an error if its input and outputs are
not errors, and we can infer the operator is an error if its input
is not an error but its output is an error. Consider a case in
which a physician is given patient information and selects a
corresponding problem, goal, and action. The panel of
experts then judge the identified problem is appropriate, but
both the goal and action are not appropriate. From this, we
can infer the operator connecting patient information to
problem selection is not an error, and the operator connect-
ing problem specification to goal selection is an error. We do
not, however, know whether the operator connecting goal
specification to action selection is an error, because if the
input to an operator is an error, then the error status of the
operator itself is ambiguous. In this case, we have the experts
judge whether the output is an error given the counterfactual
presumption that the input is not an error. This is to say the
experts judge whether the selected action is appropriate for
the selected goal regardless of the fact that the goal was actu-
ally inappropriate. For example, a physician may consider a
diabetic patient’s problem is that her A1c level is too high; the
physician selects a goal of assuring A1c level does not increase
and takes the action of ‘no action’ by maintaining current
medication levels. Experts may judge the problem is correctly
identified; however, perhaps the goal should be to lower the
A1c level to below 7% and the action should be to increase
medication dosage. From this, we know that the problem
identification operator was correct, but the goal selection
operator was an error. To discern the status of the action
selection operator, the experts judge whether keeping the
medications at the current level for this patient would assure
the A1c level does not increase: if yes, then the action selec-
tion operator is not an error and if no, then the operator is an
error.
In this design, measuring the sequence of states in each
state space associated with the decisions of a sample of pro-
viders is sufficient to locate operators that generate errors
within the perception-action cycle (i.e. interpretation, goal-
setting, or action-selection operators). A second phase of
investigation can then focus on characterizing the specific
operator as (i) preference-based, (ii) rule-based, or (iii) pattern
matching. Preference based has a structure whereby selection
is based on beliefs regarding the consequences. This model
requires a high level of deliberation. Rule-based selection has
a structure whereby selection is according to an algorithm.
Deliberation is less than that in preference-based analysis.
Pattern matching represents automated or intuitive responses
to information: deliberation is minimal. These forms of cog-
nitive operation are integrated into the problem solving hier-
archy presented in Reason’s Generic Error Modeling System
[8]. A third phase produces a detailed description of the oper-
ator and circumstances leading to error. These last two phases
are amenable to process-oriented methods such as verbal pro-
tocols [33], in which physicians’ talk aloud while problem
solving and the resulting transcripts are coded and analyzed to
distinguish the types of operators. Finally, once the errors are
identified, patient, physician, and system characteristics can
be investigated as predictors of the location and type of error.
Discussion
This paper presents a framework for the study of patient care
in terms of related sequences in the four state spaces of
decision environment, problem space, goal space, and action
space. Operators that identify problems, set goals, and select
actions relate these spaces. The purpose is to provide a frame-
work to situate medical errors in the operators underlying
patient care decisions. For a given environment, if an identi-
fied problem is an error, then the problem identification oper-
ator generated the error. Consequently, errors in the
problems, goals, or actions spaces are generated by errors in
the operators. This suggests the medical error, in so far as
they reflect decision behavior, is generated by the operators—
the mechanisms by which problems, goals, and actions are
identified.
At present, the organizational/system/human factors
focused research, and analysis of medical errors often treats
an individual-based approach in a pejorative manner, adopt-
ing language that implies moral overtones, and assumes such
a project centers on blame and individual responsibility (see
for example the introductions in [5,10,18]). The presented
individual framework should not be viewed in this light. The
proposed framework provides a means to better understand
viable explanations of error, in terms of decision making and
judgements, for the purpose of their mitigation. Indeed, the
presented framework can be situated in the popular human
factors models that draw on the latent versus active factors
taxonomy of error-generating influences [8–10]. Panel A of
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Figure 3 shows a simplified schematic of the latent versus act-
ive factors in terms of high- and low-level actions. Latent fac-
tors ‘arise from decisions made by designers, builders,
procedure writers, and top level management.’ [10] These are
high-level actions that create workplace conditions facilitative
of error under particular circumstances; they are usually not
foreseen by the high-level decision makers. Active factors ‘are
the unsafe acts committed by people who are in direct contact
with the patient or system.’ [10] These are based on the deci-
sions of the people most easily identified as proximally
responsible for patient care.
As shown in Panel B of the Figure 3, the environment,
problems, goals, actions cycle of the presented individual-
based framework is an elaboration of the former model. This
elaboration allows the researcher-analyst to ‘drill down’ and
better understand the psychological genesis of either the high-
level actions associated with latent factors or the low-level
actions associated with active factors. Consider, for example,
nurse work load as a latent factor from the high-level action
of personnel scheduling. We may identify heavy work loads as
contributing to error-prone environment. If we immediately
address the issue by a policy dictate, we may generate unex-
pected consequences: lowering work loads requires providing
less service or hiring more personnel, to afford more person-
nel may require offering less money, less money may require
hiring less-experienced personnel, and less experience may
facilitate another error-prone environment. The individual-
based framework structures a deeper investigation. For the
given decision (or task) environment, is the problem appro-
priately identified? Is there really too little capacity for the
demand? Is the problem-specific goal appropriately identified?
Should the goal be to increase capacity or decrease demand?
Is the goal-specific action appropriately selected? Should
work loads be increased, or more personnel hired, or greater
technical efficiencies implemented? Situating the latent factor
within the proposed framework locates a point of interven-
tion that may ‘fix’ the manager’s decision process having
greater impact on avoiding the generation latent factors in the
future than an immediate policy fix of the current latent fac-
tor alone.
Finally, it should be noted that the individual-based frame-
work can be expanded to include meta-operators (i.e. those
operators that select the specific decision operator used for
the task at hand) thereby allowing the definition of error func-
tions on an operator space, in which the meta-selection oper-
ators generate errors. Moreover, the framework can be
expanded to separate information-seeking actions that change
the information state but not the physiological state of the
patient and actions that change the physiological state of the
patient.
References
1. Institute of Medicine. To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health
System. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1999.
2. Quality Interagency Coordination Task Force. Doing What
Counts for Patient Safety: Federal Actions to Reduce Medical Errors and
Their Impact. Report of the Quality Interagency Coordination Task Force
(QuIC) to the President, February 2000: http://www.quic.gov/
report/toc.htm.
3. Eisenberg JM, Meyer G, Foster N. Medical errors and patient
safety: a growing research priority. Health Serv Res 2000; 35 (3):
xi–xv.
4. Meyer G, Foster N, Christrup S, Eigsenberg J. Setting a research
agenda for medical errors and patient safety. Health Serv Res
2001; 36 (1): x–xx.
5. Merry A, Smith AM. Errors, Medicine and the Law. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2001.
6. Weingart SN, Wilson RM, Gibbert RW, Harrison B. Epidemio-
logy of medical error. Br Med J 2000; 320: 774–777.
7. Rosenthal MM, Sutcliffe KM, eds. Medical Error. What Do We
Know? What Do We Do? San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2002.
8. Reason J. Human Error. New York: Cambridge University Press,
1990.
9. Vincent C, Taylor-Adams S, Stanhope N. Framework for ana-
lysing risk and safety in clinical medicine. Br Med J 1998; 316:
1154–1157.
10. Reason J. Human errors: models and management. Br Med J
2000; 320: 768–770.
Figure 3 Situating the individual-based framework within a
general human factors model. Panel A shows a simplified
representation of the latent versus active factors taxonomy of
medical error as a function of high-level and low-level
actions. Panel B is an elaboration of the model using the indi-
vidual-based framework, thereby including the problem and
goal spaces. The simple environment, problem, goal, action
structure presented in Figure 1 is evident here for both the
latent and active factors.
Pt. Care
Environment
High Level 
Actions
Work
Environment
TASK
ENVIRONMENT
Low Level 
Actions
Active
Factors
Latent
Factors
Pt. Care
Environment
High Level 
Actions
Work
Environment
TASK
ENVIRONMENT
Low Level 
Actions
Active
Factors
Latent
Factors
Problems Goals
Problems Goals
Panel  A
Panel  B
b
y
 
g
u
e
s
t
 
o
n
 
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
 
7
,
 
2
0
1
4
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 A framework for the study of error
319
11. Reason J, Parker D, Lawton R. Organizational controls and
safety: The varieties of rule-related behavior. J Occup Organ Psy-
chol 1998; 71: 289–304.
12. Taylor-Adams S, Vincent C, Stanhope N. Applying human fac-
tors methods to the investigation and analysis of clinical adverse
events. Saf Sci 1999; 31: 143–159.
13. van Vuuren W. Organisational failure: lessons from industry
applied in the medical domain. Saf Sci 1999; 33: 13–29.
14. Chang A, Schyve PM, Croteau RJ, O’leary DS, Loeb JM. The
JCAHO patient safety event taxonomy: a standardized terminol-
ogy and classification schema for near misses and adverse
events. Int J Qual Health Care 2005; 17: 95–105.
15. Pradhan M, Edmonds M, Runciman WB. Quality in healthcare:
process. Best Pract Res Clin Anaesthesiol 2001; 15 (4): 555–571.
16. Boreham NC, Shea CE, Mackway-Jones K. Clinical risk and col-
lective competence in the hospital emergency department in the
UK. Soc Sci Med 2000; 51: 83–91.
17. Lisby M, Nielsen LP, Mainz J. Errors in the medication process
frequency, type, and potential. Int J Qual Health Care 2005;
17 (1): 15–22.
18. Ternov S, Akselsson R. System weaknesses as contributing
causes of accidents in health care. Int J Qual Health Care 2005;
17 (1): 5–13.
19. Dean B, Schachter M, Vincent C, Barber N. Causes of prescrib-
ing errors in hospital inpatients: a prospective study. Lancet 2002;
359: 1373–1378.
20. Koppel R, Metlay JP, Cohen A et al. Role of computerized physi-
cian order entry systems in facilitating medication errors. JAMA
2005; 293 (10): 1197–1203.
21. Landrigan CP, Rothschild JM, Cronin JW et al. Effect of reduc-
ing interns’ work hours on serious medical errors in intensive
care units. N Engl J Med 2004; 351(18): 1838–1848.
22. Olivena A, Michalakea I, Zalmana D, Dormana E, Yeshurunb D,
Odeha M. Prevention of prescription errors by computerized, on-
line surveillance of drug order entry. Int J Med Inf 2005; 74 (5):
377–386.
23. Owen JE, Walker RJ, Edgell L et al. Implementation of a pre-
dialysis clinical pathway for patients with chronic kidney disease.
Int J Qual Health Care 2006; 18 (2): 145–151.
24. Bates DW, Gawande AA. Improving safety with information
technology. N Engl J Med 2003; 348 (25): 2526–2539.
25. Dhillon BS. Human Reliability and Error in Medical System. New
Jersey: World Scientific, 2003.
26. Dhillon BS. Human Reliability: with Human Factors. New York:
Pergamon Press, 1986.
27. Huchingson DR. New Horizons for Human Factors in Design. New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1981.
28. Wickens CDD, Lee J, Gordon-Becker S, Liu YD. Introduction to
Human Factors Engineering, second edition. Upper Saddle River:
Prentice Hall, 2004.
29. Neisser U. Cognition and Reality: Principles and Implications of Cogni-
tive Psychology. San Francisco: Freeman, 1976.
30. Newell A. Heuristic programming: ill-structured problems. In:
Aronofsky J, ed. Progress in Operations Research. New York: Wiley,
1969: 360–414.
31. Simon HA. Rational choice and the structure of the environ-
ment. Psychol Rev 1956; 63: 129–138.
32. Dhillon BS. Human error in medication. In: Human Reliability and
Error in Medical System. New Jersey: World Scientific, 2003: 89–104.
33. Ericsson KA, Simon HA. Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data,
revised edition. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993.
Accepted for publication 6 April 2006
b
y
 
g
u
e
s
t
 
o
n
 
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
 
7
,
 
2
0
1
4
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 